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NRC EFFORT TO ENHANCE SECURITY 
OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) is 
leading the effort to improve security for radioactive 
materials at the local, national, and international 
levels.  The goal is to prevent radioactive material 
from falling into the wrong hands, where it 
could be used by terrorists to frighten, injure, or 
kill Americans.
After the events of September 11, 2001, NRC 
Chairman Richard A. Meserve ordered a 
comprehensive review of the Agency’s safeguards 
and security programs.  Security at commercial 
nuclear reactors is the headline news, but NRC has 
also been working hard to enhance the security of 
radioactive materials.  Initial steps included issuance 
of a number of advisories to licensees containing, at 
first, common-sense security improvements.
These enhancements included measures such as 
higher awareness of potential threats, improved 
access control, and better security measures to 
search and limit vehicles near important facilities.  
Subsequently, the Agency has been developing 
additional measures to spell out, in detail, for 
licensees, the safeguards and security enhancements 
that need to be implemented.
In the materials arena, the first priority was given 
to large fuel cycle licensees, facilities that store 
spent fuel, and spent fuel transportation activities.  
Orders have already been issued to implement 
security measures at Independent Spent Fuel 
Storage Installations, in spent fuel transportation, 
at Category I and Category III fuel cycle and 
uranium conversion facilities.  Orders to Category 
III facilities were issued February 6, 2003.  These 
orders make binding specific security enhancements 
that, in some cases, were first mentioned in our 
initial advisories, but also include better alarms, 
vehicle barriers, tighter background checks on 
workers, more extensive emergency preparations, 
and other measures necessary to protect against 
security risks.
For other materials licensees, radioactive sources 
could be stolen or lost and end up in terrorist hands, 
where they could be used to fashion a radiological 
dispersal device (RDD), sometimes called a “dirty 
bomb.”  Intelligence reports show that acquiring 
RDDs has been one of al Qaeda’s goals.  Press 
reports describe an RDD as a “poor man’s nuclear 
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weapon,” although the hazard is dramatically less 
than a true nuclear weapon.
NRC is working with Agreement States, the 
Department of Energy, the Department of Homeland 
Security, and others to identify licensees that have 
radioactive sources that pose the greatest concern 
for use in RDDs.  We are also examining security 
measures that may be needed to reduce the risk from 
the radioactive material used by these licensees.
NRC’s efforts are just part of a larger, U.S. 
Government effort to enhance control over 
radioactive material.  The Office of Homeland 
Security, Department of Energy, and other agencies 
are working with NRC to understand and counter the 
RDD threat. 
For example, the agencies have been cooperating 
to:  calculate the risk from dispersal of radioactive 
material, using available data; evaluate which 
isotopes pose the greatest threat, identify existing 
material tracking systems; and look at disposal 
options for old, unwanted sources.
NRC staff are involved in groups looking at the 
feasibility of a system to track radioactive materials, 
how to manage sources that are discarded, how 
to more securely transport radioactive materials 
and detect sources concealed in shipment, how to 
manage the consequences of a successful RDD 
attack, and other challenges.
The effort doesn’t stop at America’s borders.  NRC 
is also heavily involved with the International 
Atomic Energy Agency, a United Nations agency, 
to carry the effort to the rest of the world.  One 
of the goals of this work is to gain better control 
of radioactive material, including enhancements 
to security during its import, export, and 
subsequent use.
The effort to enhance security for radioactive 
materials is substantial and comprehensive.  But, 
we believe the improved security that results will 
reduce the risk of a successful terrorist attack, using 
radioactive materials, while allowing continued use 
of the material for the benefit of society.
(Contact: Fritz Sturz, NSIR, 301-415-6678; 
e-mail; fcs@nrc.gov)
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF  ENERGY 
OFF-SITE SOURCE RECOVERY 
PROJECT FOR GTCC SOURCES
Many greater than Class C (GTCC) sealed sources 
are excess, unwanted, and orphaned in the industrial, 
medical, academic, and government sectors. This 
presents a growing problem because these sources 
are not suitable for disposal in shallow land burial 
facilities. Other appropriate disposal options are not 
yet available. The Off-Site Source Recovery (OSR) 
Project, managed by the U.S. Department of Energy 
(DOE) at the Los Alamos National Laboratory 
(LANL), collects and stores these sources. 
GTCC sealed sources consist mainly of americium 
neutron sources, other americium-241 sources, 
plutonium-238 heat sources, plutonium-239 neutron 
sources, and large strontium-90 sources. Large 
cesium-137 sources also typically exceed the U.S. 
regulatory criteria for shallow low-level radioactive 
waste (LLW) disposal, but are largely recycled and 
remanufactured into new sources.
An Emergency Response Team Recovers a Damaged 
Americium Neutron Source in Texas
Public health and safety risks are posed by unwanted 
GTCC sealed sources. One of the most common 
isotopes used is americium-241. Many of these are 
used in oil and gas well-logging activities. Small 
firms lacking the physical capability and financial 
resources to provide safe storage commonly own 
these neutron sources.
Considerable numbers of heat sources containing 
plutonium-238 once were used in manufacturing 
cardiac pacemakers.  2 3
These pacemakers and plutonium-238 batteries 
became obsolete in the 1970s, with the onset of 
long-life chemical battery technology. The OSR 
Project has recovered approximately 2000 excess 
and unwanted pacemakers.
Licensees in the U.S. use GTCC sealed sources 
primarily in portable and fixed industrial 
gauges. Approximately 9000 such sources, 
chiefly containing americium-241, are found in 
manufacturing and general commerce. Recovering 
these sources is particularly important, because 
many are excess and unwanted, and commonly are 
lost, stolen, or inadvertently discarded. 
Source Recovery and Storage
Beginning in the late 1990s, DOE greatly expanded 
the sealed source handling capacity at LANL to 
accommodate thousands of excess sealed sources 
from the commercial sector. Initially, neutron 
sources were chemically processed to eliminate 
neutron generation. However, this was determined to 
be unnecessary. Instead, excess and unwanted sealed 
sources are simply stored as radioactive waste at 
government nuclear facilities.
This strategy required developing new nuclear 
material containers specifically for neutron sources. 
The first of these is a special-form overpack capsule 
for individual sources. The second is a multi-
function container capable of providing safe storage, 
transportation, and ultimately disposal. 
The special-form capsule has been designed, tested, 
and certified in several configurations. Composed of 
thick-walled stainless steel, it safely stores and ships 
damaged sealed sources, or sources that, for other 
reasons, cannot be certified for transportation. Once 
closed, a special-form capsule cannot be reopened. 
DOE and LANL continue to modify and fabricate 
these capsules to accommodate unique sources 
as they appear, especially from nuclear research 
and development laboratories. These capsules are 
available for both government and commercial 
radioactive waste management activities. 
The multi-function container evolved from 
containers used by DOE for transportation and 
disposal of transuranic waste. The container 
incorporates neutron shielding and accommodates 
considerable quantities of neutron sources without 
special handling requirements. The pipe overpack 
concept was modified to provide a narrow-diameter 
[15-centimeter (5.9-inch)] inner payload container, 
within a standard 208-liter (55-gallon) drum. The 
annular space is filled by neutron shielding material. 
This multi-function container has been evaluated 
and approved by the transuranic waste certification 
program, and is now acceptable for field recovery, 
transportation, long-term storage, and disposal in the 
waste repository
Cost, Capacity, and Schedule
The OSR Project reached a 5000-source recovery 
milestone in 2002. Another 4000 sealed sources are 
known to be excess and unwanted, and are slated 
for recovery by 2005.  The OSR Project expects to 
store more than 14,000 GTCC sealed sources by 
Sealed Sources Prepared for Loading into a Multi-
Function Drum
The special form over-pack capsule4 5
2010.  Subsequent sealed source recovery will occur 
at a pace depending on numbers of sources declared 
excess, and funding levels. 
Current OSR Project operating costs for sealed 
source recovery and management average less 
than $3000 per source. Large licensees may incur 
the costs for packaging, shipment, and storage of 
sources at LANL. However, DOE is working with 
small licensees to reduce or eliminate costs. 
Ultimate Disposition 
No established disposition path exists for most 
GTCC sealed sources. The only suitable disposal 
site is the Waste Isolation Pilot Project (WIPP), 
a geological repository mined in bedded salt 
formations in southeastern New Mexico. It is 
restricted to transuranic waste generated from 
the nuclear defense program.  A large share of 
waste from the OSR Project will be generated 
by the commercial and academic sector. These 
waste streams cannot be disposed of with Federal 
Government waste at WIPP.
addresses a substantial public health and safety risk; 
recovers sources from the commercial and academic 
sector, more promptly than previously; and provides 
safe, long-term storage.
You Can Help 
DOE requests cooperation from GTCC radioactive 
source holders to register all sources, even those that 
are currently in use, with the OSR Project on line at 
http://osrp.lanl.gov/. Source registration is voluntary, 
but allows DOE to plan and prioritize recovery 
efforts. The source registry is a key component in 
planning to ensure that adequate funding, facility, 
and personnel resources are available to recover, 
store, and eventually dispose of GTCC sources. 
To register sources online, visit http://
osrp.lanl.gov/.  For more information about the OSR 
Project, visit the new DOE OSR Project website at 
http://www.doeal.gov/OSRP.
(Contact: Joel Grimm, 505-845-5463; 
e-mail: jgrimm@doeal.gov)
LICENSE APPLICATION RECEIVED 
FROM U.S. ENRICHMENT 
CORPORATION
On February 12, 2003, the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory 
Commission received a license application,  from 
the U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC), to 
operate a gas centrifuge uranium enrichment test 
and demonstration facility (Lead Cascade) for 
5 years.  The proposed facility will be based on 
U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) advanced gas 
centrifuge technology.  USEC plans to assemble 
and operate the Lead Cascade in an existing DOE 
gas centrifuge building located at the Portsmouth 
Gaseous Diffusion Plant site in Piketon, Ohio.  
The Lead Cascade, which will consist of up to 
240 centrifuges, will provide USEC with reliable 
information on the machines and auxiliary systems, 
as they would be used in commercial operations. 
The staff anticipates completing its acceptance 
review of the Lead Cascade facility application 
by March 14 and issuing a Notice of Opportunity 
for Hearing by March 28, 2003.  Final licensing 
approval for this site is expected to be issued in early 
2004.  USEC plans to submit a license application 
Packaged Sealed Sources Are Prepared for 
Shipping to LANL
Therefore, the OSR Project will develop and 
provide storage capacity until a disposal pathway 
is developed. OSR Project projections indicate less 
than 500 cubic meters (654 cubic yards) of waste in 
shielded containers will require indefinite storage. 
The next step is to examine final disposal options.
The OSR Project for managing large numbers 
of excess and unwanted GTCC sealed sources 4 5
for its commercial-scale facility in late 2004 or 
early 2005. 
In a separate action, Louisiana Energy Services 
(LES) has delayed the submittal of its application 
for a commercial-scale gas centrifuge enrichment 
facility.  LES notified the staff, on January 29, 
2003, that the application, originally scheduled for 
January 30, would be delayed for approximately 
6 weeks.  The reason cited for the delay was 
to resolve utility contractual commitments 
regarding output.
(Contact: Yawar Faraz, 301-415-8113, 
e-mail: yhf@nrc.gov)
SIGNIFICANT EVENTS
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) 
is providing summaries of these events to inform 
licensees of conditions they may encounter and of 
actions that may be taken to deal with them.
Event 1: Industrial Radiographer receives a 
Total Effective Dose Equivalent in Excess of  
25 centiSievert (rem) from a Single Event
Date and Place: October 18, 2002; Huntington 
Testing and Technology, Ghent, Kentucky.
Nature and Probable Consequences:  An Agreement 
State licensee reported an overexposure, to an 
industrial radiographer, of 31.4 centiSievert (cSv) 
(rem) for 2002. A radiographer was reeling in the 
3.81-terabecquerel (103-curie) iridium-192 source 
after an exposure, when the source did not fully 
retract to its shielding position. The radiographer, 
unaware of this situation, entered the restricted 
area for approximately 3 minutes.  When he 
realized that the source was not fully retracted, 
he immediately left the area, extended the source, 
and then retracted it to the shielded position.  [The 
exposure device (Model 660–B, Serial #B2954) 
involved was manufactured by AEA Technologies.]  
The licensee’s  Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) 
was contacted and the radiographer was removed 
from radiological work.  His dosimetry was sent 
for processing and results indicated a whole-
body exposure of only 4.86 cSv (rem).  However, 
the licensee, with assistance from the AEA 
Technologies’ RSO, completed a reconstruction of 
the whole-body exposure to the radiographer. The 
final result of the incident was an event exposure 
of 30 cSv (rem) whole-body, in addition to his 
year-to-date exposure of 1.4 cSv (rem), for a total 
yearly whole-body exposure of 31.4 cSv (rem).  
Discussions with the State regulatory agency, 
along with independent calculations, confirmed 
the 30 cSv (-rem) event exposure.  The licensee 
stated that the thermoluminescent dosimeter and 
operating ratemeter were in the radiographer’s 
pocket.  Consequently, the badge did not reflect 
true whole-body exposure and the alarm ratemeter 
was never heard in an alarming condition. The 
cause of the event included inadequate operating 
procedures for the exposure device, the radiographer 
having his alarm ratemeter in his pocket, and failure 
to survey the exposure device on completion of 
the radiograph.
Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence
Licensee: The licensee’s corrective actions included 
revising the operating procedure for restoration of 
the source to the exposure device; personnel training 
on the revised procedure and proper wearing of 
dosimetry devices; and annual refresher training 
on proper operation and responses of survey 
instrumentation.  Also, the radiographer involved 
in this event will receive an additional 40 hours of 
radiation safety training before returning to work in 
radiography, and will be evaluated at least once a 
month for the next year. The State of Kentucky has 
accepted the licensee’s corrective actions. 
Event 2: Individual Members of the Public Receive 
Doses in Excess of 0.1 centiSievert (rem)
Date and Place: July 1, 2002; Saint Joseph Mercy 
Hospital; Ann Arbor, Michigan.
Nature and Probable Consequences:  An NRC 
licensee reported that several members of the 
public (all over 18 years of age) received radiation 
exposures in excess of regulatory limits.  The 
exposures occurred during visits by family members 
to a patient who had received a therapeutic dose 
of 10.6 gigabecquerel (285 millicuries) of iodine-
131 (I–131) on July 1, 2002.  The individuals 
visited throughout the treatment period and were 
in prolonged, close contact with the patient.  
Because of the patient’s poor renal function, 6 7
typical biological elimination of the I–131 did not 
occur. Radiation levels measured on July 1 were 
4 millisieverts (mSv)/hr  (400 mrem/hr) at the 
bedside and  0.4 mSv/hr (40 mrem/hr) at 1 meter 
(3.3 feet).  The Radiation Safety Officer (RSO) 
estimated that one individual received a radiation 
dose in the range of 3.0 to 5.673 centisievent (cSv) 
(rem).  The RSO estimated that approximately 10 
other individuals received radiation doses as high as 
0.5 cSv (-rem).  The licensee had placed shielding 
around the patient to reduce the radiation levels and 
counseled the individuals on the need to minimize 
their time and proximity to the patient.  Many of 
the individuals did not adhere to the directions and 
controls established to minimize radiation exposure.  
Based on additional information received during 
interviews, NRC inspectors estimated the highest 
dose received to be 0.15 sievert (15 rem).
Actions Taken to Prevent Recurrence
Licensee:  Corrective actions include staff education 
regarding potential safety concerns of staff and 
family members; notifying NRC of any unusual 
circumstances when family members fail to follow 
procedures; convening a family care conference to 
discuss a plan for care of the patient and discuss 
family concerns; and modifying the procedures 
for allowing visitors into rooms of patients 
undergoing therapy. 
NRC: The NRC Region III conducted a special 
inspection from October 4 through October 16, 
2002, with in-office review through November 15, 
2002.  NRC has not made a final determination in 
this matter.
(Contact: Roberto Torres, NMSS, 301-415-8112; 
e-mail: rjt@nrc.gov)
GENERIC COMMUNICATIONS ISSUED
(November 1, 2002–January 31, 2003)
Note that these are only summaries of U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) generic 
communications.  If one of these documents appears 
relevant to your needs and you have not received it, 
please call one of the technical contacts listed below.  
The Internet address for the NRC library of generic 
communications is:  http://www.nrc.gov/reading-rm/
doc-collections/gen-comm/index.html.  Please 
note that this address is case-sensitive and must be 
entered exactly as shown.
Information Notices (INs)
IN 2002-30, “Control and Surveillance of Portable 
Gauges during Field Operations,” was issued on 
October 30, 2002.  This notice was issued to all 
licensees authorized to possess, use, transport, 
and store portable gauges, to remind them of 
their responsibility to maintain control and 
constant surveillance of portable gauges during 
field operations.
(Contact: Michael T. Markley, NMSS, 
301-415-5723, e-mail: mtm@nrc.gov)
IN 2002–31, “Potentially Defective UF6 Cylinder 
Valves (1-Inch),” was issued on October 31, 2002.  
This notice was issued to all licensees authorized 
to possess and use source material and/or special 
nuclear material for the heating, emptying, filling, or 
shipping of uranium hexafluoride (UF-6) in 30-inch 
and 48-inch cylinders.  The purpose of this notice 
was to inform addressees about safety concerns 
related to UF6 cylinder valves manufactured by the 
Hunt Valve Company, Inc., of Salem, Ohio. The two 
safety concerns involve:  (1) cracked packing nuts 
and (2) the loss of material traceability and failure to 
conduct hardness testing of the valve stems.
(Contacts: William Troskoski, NMSS, 
301-415-8076, e-mail: wmt@nrc.gov; 
Geoffrey Hornseth, NMSS, 301-415-2756, 
e-mail: gph@nrc.gov)
IN 2002–33, “Notification of Permanent Injunction 
against Neutron Products Incorporated of Dickerson, 
Maryland,” was issued on November 22, 2002.  This 
notice was issued to all teletherapy and radiation 
processing licensees to inform them that the State 
of Maryland has placed a permanent injunction on 
the company Neutron Products, Inc. (NPI), 22301 
Mount Ephraim Road, Dickerson, Maryland 20842, 
radioactive materials license number MD-31-025-
01.  The State has requested that NRC licensees be 
informed of this action because of potential impact 
on those using NPI sources.6 7
(Contact: Raymond Manley, Supervisor, Radioactive 
Material Licensing Section, State of Maryland 
Radiological Health Program, Maryland Department 
of the Environment, 1800 Washington Boulevard, 
Suite 705, Baltimore, MD 21230–1720; telephone: 
410-537-3301; e-mail: rmanley@mde.state.md.us)
IN 2002-35, “Changes to 10 CFR Parts 71 and 
72 Quality Assurance Programs,” was issued on 
December 20, 2002.  This notice was issued to 
all holders of 10 CFR Part 71 quality assurance 
program approvals and all 10 CFR Part 72 licensees 
and certificate holders to remind them of the 
requirement to obtain NRC approval of all changes 
to Parts 71 and 72 quality assurance programs before 
implementation of the changes.
(Contact: Frank Jacobs, NMSS, 301-415-3961, 
e-mail: fxj2@nrc.gov) 
IN 2002–36, “Incomplete or Inaccurate Information 
Provided to the Licensee and/or NRC by any 
Contractor or Subcontractor Employee,” was issued 
on December 27, 2002.  This notice was issued to 
all materials and fuel cycle licensees and certificate 
holders to remind them of the importance of 
diligently ascertaining the accuracy of educational 
background and professional qualifications of any 
contractor or subcontractor employees subject to 
such qualification requirement.  This notice also 
alerts addressees to the potential penalties that could 
result from intentionally providing incomplete or 
inaccurate information to NRC.
(Contacts: Ivelisse M. Cabrera, NMSS, 
301-415-8152, e-mail: imc1@nrc.gov; 
Thomas R. Decker, RII, 404-562-4721, 
e-mail: trd@nrc.gov)
Regulatory Issue Summaries (RISs)
RIS 2002-20, “Clarification of Requirements under 
10 CFR 35.432—Calibration Measurements of 
Brachytherapy Sources,” was issued on November 7, 
2002.  This summary was issued to all medical 
licensees to provide clarification to them concerning 
the requirements under 10 CFR 35.432, “Calibration 
of Measurements of  Brachytherapy Sources.”
(Contact: Linda Psyk, NMSS, 301-415-0215, 
e-mail: lmp1@nrc.gov)
RIS 2002–23, “Availability of Guide for Diagnostic 
Nuclear Medicine,” was issued on November 27, 
2002.  This summary was issued to all medical 
licensees to inform them of the availability, 
from NRC, of a “Guide for Diagnostic Nuclear 
Medicine,” prepared by the American College of 
Nuclear Physicians and the Society of Nuclear 
Medicine and published under the auspices of the 
Society of Nuclear Medicine.
(Contact: Roger W. Broseus, NMSS, 301-415-7608, 
e-mail: rwb@nrc.gov)
RIS 2003–04, “Use of the Effective Dose Equivalent 
in place of the Deep Dose Equivalent in Dose 
Assessments,” was issued on February 13, 2003.  
This summary was issued to all NRC licensees 
to provide guidance on situations in which it is 
permissible to use the effective dose equivalent, 
in place of the deep dose equivalent, in showing 
compliance with regulatory requirements.
(Contacts: Sami Sherbini, NMSS, 301-415-7853, 
e-mail: sxs2@nrc.gov; Roger Pedersen, NRR, 
301-415-3162, e-mail: rlp1@nrc.gov)
(General Contact: Ivelisse M. Cabrera, NMSS, 
301-415-8152, e-mail: imc1@nrc.gov)
SIGNIFICANT ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS
The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission’s (NRC’s) 
enforcement program can be accessed via NRC’s 
homepage [http://www.nrc.gov] under “What We 
Do.”  Documents related to cases can be accessed 
at http://www.nrc.gov, “Electronic Reading Room,” 
“Documents in ADAMS.”  ADAMS is the Agency-
Wide Document Access and Management System.  
Help in using ADAMS is available from the NRC 
Public Document Room, telephone: 301-415-4737 
or 1-800-397-4209. 
Gauges
Advance Testing Company, Inc. (EA-03-001)
On January 28, 2003, a Notice of Violation was 
issued for a Severity Level III violation involving the 
failure to control and maintain constant surveillance 
of licensed material [296 meqabecquerel (mBq) (8 
millicuries) (mCi) of cesium-137 and 1480 mBq 8 9
(40 mCi) of americium-241 in a moisture density 
gauge] located at a temporary job site, which was in 
an unrestricted area. 
Columbia Curb & Gutter Company (EA-02-263)
On January 21, 2003, a Notice of Violation was 
issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 
the failure to secure from unauthorized removal or 
limit access to, licensed material [289 megabecqurel 
(mBq) (7.8 millicuries) (mCi) of cesium-137 and 
1480 mBq (40 mCi) of americium-241 contained 
in a moisture density gauge] in an unrestricted area, 
and the failure to control and maintain constant 
surveillance of this licensed material.
Rio Construction Corporation (EA-02-215)
On January 15, 2003, a Notice of Violation and 
Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount 
of $3000 was issued for a Severity Level III 
violation. This involved an individual who had not 
been provided required radiation safety training, 
and who did not work under the supervision and in 
the physical presence of an individual who had the 
required radiation safety training, using a moisture 
density gauge, despite this.  
Delta Consulting Engineers, Inc. (EA-03-002)
On January 13, 2003, a Notice of Violation was 
issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 
the failure to control and maintain constant 
surveillance of licensed material [approximately 
333 megabequerel (mBq) (9 millicuries) (mCi) 
of cesium-137 and 1628 mBq (44 mCi) of  
americium-241 in a portable moisture density gauge] 
that is in a controlled or unrestricted area and that is 
not in storage.
Medical
Medical Providers Capital Network (EA-02-205)
On February 11, 2003, a Notice of Violation and 
Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount 
of $3000 was issued for a willful Severity Level III 
problem involving: (1) the failure of the authorized 
user/radiation safety officer (AU/RSO) to perform 
monthly visits to the licensee’s facilities to review 
the use of byproduct material, as required by a 
condition of the license; (2) the creation of false 
records that the visits had occurred; and (3) the 
receipt, possession, and use of a byproduct material 
without the supervision of an AU/RSO. 
University of Puerto Rico (EA-02-227)
On February 7, 2003, a Notice of Violation and 
Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalties in the amount 
of $9000 was issued for three willful Severity 
Level III violations involving: (1) the failure to 
perform daily radiation surveys of areas where 
radiopharmaceuticals are routinely administered 
to patients; (2) the failure of the radiation 
Safety Officer (RSO) to calibrate contamination 
survey instruments annually in accordance with 
requirements; and (3) the failure to notify the RSO 
immediately, after unexpectedly high radiation levels 
were found, in accordance with requirements. 
Community Health Center of Branch County 
(EA-02-23)
On December 11, 2002, a Notice of Violation was 
issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 
the failure to secure, from unauthorized removal, 
or limit access to, licensed material,  and the failure 
to control and maintain constant surveillance of 
licensed material.
University of Pennsylvania (EA-02-214)
On December 11, 2002, a letter was issued 
documenting NRC’s decision to exercise 
enforcement discretion in accordance with Section 
VII.B.6 of the Enforcement Policy for a violation 
involving an exposure in excess of regulatory limits 
to a member of the public. The violation involved 
the parent of a child treated with iodine-131 
who received a total effective dose equivalent of 
0.7 centisievert (cSv) (rem) while providing care 
for the child during a treatment in September 2002.  
Discretion was warranted because the licensee 
took reasonable actions to keep the dose as low 
as is reasonably achievable by giving training 
and direction to the parent and by monitoring the 
parent’s dose with a personal dosimeter.  In addition, 
NRC recently approved the licensee’s request to 
authorize a 2.0-cSv (rem) annual dose limit for the 
parent involved with the treatment, so that the parent 8 9
could provide care to the child during a second 
treatment, which was subsequently completed in 
November 2002.
Washington Hospital (EA-02-244)
On November 26, 2002, a Notice of Violation was 
issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 
the failure to properly prepare written directives on 
multiple occasions for brachytherapy treatments.
Radiography
H&H X-Ray Services, Inc. (EA-02-195)
On February 3, 2003, a Notice of Violation 
was issued for a Severity Level III problem 
involving: (1) the failure to reduce the allowable 
dose limit for an individual by 1.25 centiSievert 
(cSv) (rem) for each quarter for which complete 
records were unavailable; and (2) as a result, the 
failure to limit the annual occupational dose to an 
adult radiographer to 5 cSv (rem) total effective 
dose equivalent.  
Magna Chek, Inc.  (EA-02-221)
On January 29, 2003, a Notice of Violation and 
Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the amount 
of $6000 was issued for a Severity Level III 
violation involving the performance of radiographic 
operations by an uncertified individual at the 
licensee’s permanent radiographic facility, and at 
temporary job sites. Since the licensee does not 
intend to use the material in the future, the license 
was amended for storage incident to disposal. To 
encourage prompt disposal of the sources, NRC has 
given the licensee 60 days to dispose of the material, 
in which case, NRC will forego the proposed 
civil penalty.
Testing Technologies, Inc. (EA-02-166)
On January 22, 2003, a Notice of Violation and 
Proposed Imposition of Civil Penalty in the 
amount of $9600 was issued for a Severity Level II 
problem involving the willful: (1) performance of 
radiographic operations at temporary job sites by 
radiographers’ assistants and helpers who were not 
accompanied by at least one qualified radiographer; 
(2) performance of radiographic operations by 
individuals who had not met training requirements; 
(3) failure to wear a combination of a direct reading 
pocket dosimeter, an alarming ratemeter, and either 
a film badge or thermoluminescent dosimeter; and 
(4) failure of the corporate and site Radiation Safety 
Officer to oversee the radiation safety program.
Dayton X-Ray Company (EA-02-201)
On November 29, 2002, a Notice of Violation was 
issued for a Severity Level III violation involving 
the performance of radiographic operations 
at a temporary job with only one qualified 
individual present. 
Individual Actions 
Stuart Jones, M.D. (IA-02-046)
On February 11, 2003, a Notice of Violation was 
issued for a Severity Level III violation based on 
the individual’s deliberate activities while employed 
at Medical Providers Capital Network. As the 
authorized user/radiation safety officer (AU/RSO), 
the individual deliberately failed to provide required 
AU/RSO oversight of the licensee’s facilities and 
deliberately falsified records with respect to the 
performance of these duties.
Dr. Heriberto Torres (IA-02-054)
On February 7, 2003, a Notice of Violation was 
issued for a Severity Level III violation based on 
the individual’s deliberate activities while employed 
by the University of Puerto Rico. As the Radiation 
Safety Officer, the individual was aware that direct 
radiation level surveys were not being performed 
daily in areas where radiopharmaceuticals were 
routinely prepared for use or administered to 
patients, and he took no effective action to correct 
the situation.
Dr. Frieda Silva (IA-02-053)
On February 7, 2003, a Notice of Violation was 
issued for a Severity Level III violation based on 
the individual’s deliberate activities while employed 
by the University of Puerto Rico. As the Chairman 
of the Radiation Safety Committee and Chief 10 11
of Nuclear Medicine, the individual was aware 
that direct radiation-level surveys were not being 
performed daily in areas where radiopharmaceuticals 
were routinely prepared for use or administered to 
patients, and he took no effective action to correct 
the situation. 
James Fowler (IA-02-057)
On January 29, 2003, a Notice of Violation was 
issued for a Severity Level III violation based on 
the individual’s deliberate activities while employed 
at Magna Chek, Inc., Madison Heights, Michigan. 
The individual deliberately performed radiographic 
operations without being certified through a 
recognized radiographer certification program. The 
radiographic operations by this individual were 
performed at the licensee’s permanent radiographic 
facility, and at temporary job sites.
Scott Kinsella (IA-02-043)
On January 22, 2003, a Notice of Violation was 
issued for a Severity Level III violation, based on 
the individual’s deliberate activities while employed 
at Engineering and Inspections, Unlimited, Inc., 
a company authorized to conduct radiographic 
activities under the materials license of Testing 
Technologies Inc., an NRC licensee. The individual 
participated in radiographic operations at multiple 
temporary job sites, with the knowledge that these 
operations did not conform to NRC requirements 
and dispatched individuals to conduct radiographic 
operations at multiple temporary job sites, with the 
knowledge that the dispatched individuals were not 
in compliance with NRC training requirements. 
Brian McKenna (IA-02-030)
On January 22, 2003, a Notice of Violation was 
issued for a Severity Level II violation, based on 
the individual’s deliberate activities while employed 
at Engineering and Inspections, Unlimited, Inc., 
a company authorized to conduct radiographic 
activities under the materials license of Testing 
Technologies Inc., an NRC licensee. The individual 
participated in radiographic operations at multiple 
temporary job sites with the knowledge that these 
operations did not conform to NRC requirements, 
and dispatched individuals to conduct radiographic 
operations at multiple temporary job sites, with the 
knowledge that the dispatched individuals were not 
in compliance with NRC training requirements.
Ramón Baquero (IA-03-001)
On January 15, 2003, a Notice of Violation was 
issued for a Severity Level III violation based on 
the individual’s deliberate activities while employed 
at the Rio Construction Corporation.  As a Project 
Manager, the individual deliberately permitted the 
use of a moisture density gauge (NRC-licensed 
materials) by an individual who had not been 
provided required radiation safety training.
(Contact: Sally Merchant, 301-415-2747; 
e-mail: slm2@nrc.gov)
SELECTED FEDERAL REGISTER 
NOTICES
(December 1, 2002 – February 28, 2003)
NOTE:  U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission 
(NRC) contacts may be reached by mail at the U.S. 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC  
20555–0001.
FINAL RULES
“Material Control and Accounting Amendments,” 67 
FR 78130, December 23, 2002.   
(Contact:  Merri Horn, 301-415-8126; 
e-mail:  mlh1@nrc.gov)
“Decommissioning Trust Provisions,” 67 FR 78332, 
December 24, 2003. 
(Contact:  Brian J. Richter, 301-415-1978; 
e-mail:  bjr@nrc.gov)
“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: 
Standardized Advanced NUHOMS–24PT1; 
Addition,” 68 FR 463, January 6, 2003.
(Contact:  Jayne McCausland, 301-415-6219; 
e-mail:  jmm2@nrc.gov)
“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: 
VSC–24 Revision; Direct final rule; confirmation of 
effective date,” 68 FR 2686, January 21, 2003.10 11
Comments, and suggestions you may have for 
information not currently included, that might be 
helpful to licensees, should be sent to:
E. Kraus
NMSS Licensee Newsletter Editor
Office of Nuclear Material Safety and Safeguards
Two White Flint North, Mail Stop 8-A-23
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Washington, D.C. 20555-0001
(Contact: Jayne M. McCausland, 301-415-6219; 
e-mail: jmm2@nrc.gov)
“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks: 
FuelSolutions Cask System Revision,” 68 FR 8445, 
February 21, 2003.
(Contact: Jayne M. McCausland, 301-415-6219; 
e-mail:  jmm2@nrc.gov)
PROPOSED RULES
“List of Approved Spent Fuel Storage Casks:  
FuelSolutions Cask System Revision,” 68 FR 8472, 
February 21, 2003.   
(Contact: Jayne M. McCausland, 301-415-6219; 
e-mail:  jmm2@nrc.gov)
OTHER NOTICES
“Memorandum of Understanding Between the US 
NRC and the US Department of Health and Human 
Services, Food and Drug Administration (Notice of 
renewal),” 67 FR 78262, December 23, 2002.
(Contact:  Thomas H. Essig, 301-415-7231; 
e-mail: the@nrc.gov) 
“Notice of Availability, ‘Consolidated NMSS 
Decommissioning Guidance: Financial Assurance, 
Recordkeeping, and Timeliness’ (NUREG–1757, 
Vol. 3),” 68 FR 1487, January 10, 2003.
(Contact:  Duane W. Schmidt, 301-415-6919; 
e-mail: dws2@nrc.gov)
“Availability of NUREG/CR–6477, ‘Revised 
Analysis of Decommissioning Reference 
Non-Fuel-Cycle Facilities,’  ” 68 FR 4801, 
January 30, 2003.
(Contact: Clark Prichard, 301-415-6203; 
e-mail:  cwp@nrc.gov)
“Solicitation of Public Comments on Spent Fuel 
Transportation Package Performance Study Test 
Protocols, NUREG–1768 (draft),” 68 FR 8530, 
February 21, 2003.     
(Contact:  Dr. Andrew J. Murphy, 301-415-6011; 
e-mail:  ajm1@nrc.gov)
“State of Nevada; Denial of a Petition for 
Rulemaking (PRM-63-1),” 68 FR 9023, 
February 27, 2003.
(Contacts: Timothy McCartin, 301-415-7285 or 
Toll-Free: 1-800-368-5642; e-mail: tjm3@nrc.gov;
Clark Prichard, 301-415-6203 or Toll-Free: 
1-800-368-5642; e-mail: cwp@nrc.gov
“Rulemaking on Controlling the Disposition of 
Solid Materials: Scoping Process for Environmental 
Issues and Notice of Workshop,” 68 FR 9595, 
February 28, 2003.
(Contact: Frank Cardile, 301-415-6185; 
e-mail:  fpc@nrc.gov
Specific comments on the public meeting process 
should be directed to Chip Cameron; 301-415-1642; 
e-mail:  fxc@nrc.gov)
(General Contact: Paul Goldberg, NMSS, 
301-415-7842; e-mail: pfg@nrc.gov)